Comprising 57 member states, the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is the second largest intergovernmental organization in the world after the United Nations. Its membership extends from Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Middle East to Africa, Eurasia, the Balkans and South America.
) the OIC's record is shown to be full of confusing and even self-contradictory statements on Islam and human rights. For them, the OIC is not a competent organization for promoting the human rights as an universal value. As our major question, the paper seeks to evaluate the index growth of human rights and their criteria in OIC. Which are the main instruments for Safeguard of Human Rights in the OIC? Has the OIC been successful in Promotion of human rights in the Member States and in the world? In arguing the OIC as a human rights actor and the issues preventing it from achieving such a role, this study tries to change the discussion on Islam and human rights from a cultural and religious complex to an institutional context. As such, its emphasis is not on the compatibility of sharia with universal human rights, but on the important obstacles that prevent the OIC and its members from founding operational mechanisms.
To carry out the research, a descriptive and analytical method is selected and based on OIC documents, it will be a documented analysis.
Theoretical Debate: Constructivism
Constructivism is not a theory, but to some degree, a kind of ontology: A set of suppositions about the world and human inspiration. Its counterpart is not Realism, Institutionalism, or Liberalism, but rather rationalism. By challenging the rationalist agenda that undergirds many theories of international relations, Constructivists create constructivist alternatives in each of these packages of theories. (Slaughter.2011) Constructivist Theories while realism and liberalism tend to focus on material aspects such as power or trade, constructivist approaches underline the impact of ideas. Instead of taking the state for granted and assuming that it simply seeks to survive, constructivists regard the interests and identities of states as a highly flexible product of specific historical developments. (Walt. 1998 :30) To be a constructivist in international relations means observing the international relations with a look to the social construction of players, institutions, and events. It means starting from the postulation that how societies and countries think and behave in world politics is premised on their understanding of the world around them, which includes their own beliefs about the world, the identities they hold about themselves and others, and the mutual understandings and practices in which they share. ( Hurd.2008) Constructivists admitted that their conceptualization about the world is not value-free. Unlike neorealism and neoliberalism, there is no neutral claim in constructivism. Social situation where constructivists live do affect their interpretations. Scholars do not live in a vacuum capsule that makes them sterile from values. No place without values in the world. Flying to the sky and using bird -eyes to picture the world structure do not make scholars -especially rational neorealist and neoliberalists -free from values. There is atmosphere of values in the sky that will pollute them. ( Nugroho.2008:89) This conception is raised from a compound and particular synthesis of history, ideas, norms, and dogmas which scholars must recognize if they are to illuminate State behavior. For example, Constructivists claim that the nuclear arsenals of the U K and China, though comparably destructive, have very different significances to the USA that translate into very different forms of interaction (Wendt 1995) .
A concentration on the social situation in which international relations occur, leads Constructivists to underline topics of identity and belief. The perception of friends and enemies, in-groups and out-groups, fairness and justice all become key determinant of a State's policy.
Bettiza tries by his paper to expand the space of constructivist theory on norms diffusion by considering the case of religious normative action by non-Western international players. (Bettiza.2014) The OIC Members try to expose their assumptions about human rights relying on their understanding and conceptions of Islam. In fact, they follow the beliefs and values confirmed with the Shariya`s principles. So they look at the human rights by an Islamic ontology.
Data and Analysis

OIC Human Rights Instruments and Mechanisms
The OIC has attempted to base its perception of human rights on several sources like: world] to realize renaissance", and "to take practical stages towards consolidation the connections of Islamic unity, achieve union of ranks, and project the correct image and noble values of Islam and its civilizational attitudes "(OIC-TYPA. 2005). "As part of a larger development of the OIC, the TYPA introduces a clear concentration on universal human rights and the significance of mainstreaming them into all programs and accomplishments", Mayer announces. (Mayer.2015) Specifically on human rights and democracy, it outlines a strategy to renew OIC's emphasis on "democracy, civil society, political participation and respect for human rights" in order to face the challenges of "continued marginalization of the Ummah" and offer stability to realize development and progress. The Ten-Year Program of Action called on OIC members to consider the establishment of an independent permanent body to endorse human rights and to elaborate an OIC human rights charter. (OIC-TYPA. 2005).
-Islamic humanitarianism. The OIC's humanitarian role comes back to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the mid-1990s. Since then the organization's humanitarian assortment has been increased considerably, and its humanitarian task has been institutionalized in the Islamic Cooperation Humanitarian Affairs Department (ICHAD), established in 2008. ICHAD and the OIC's Ten-Year Program of Action (OIC-TYPOA) are both illuminating of the organization's plan to fortify its involvement in humanitarian issue. The OIC-TYPOA does not use the word 'humanitarian', nor does it clearly show how the OIC comprehends humanitarian action, and aside from prominent exceptions such as the Indian Ocean tsunami and the Somali famine much of the OIC's action has concentrated on recovery and development-oriented activities, with post-crisis rebuilding seen as a vital means of fortifying initial humanitarian achievements. The level of connectedness and interlacing of assistance and recovery makes questions with regard to humanitarian doctrines, chiefly when the same organization offers humanitarian assistance along with backing to a country that is not generally accepted by the residents. The OIC attaches great importance to the matter of disaster risk reduction and the obligation to reduce the loss of life, livelihood and economic properties through natural disasters, an initiative which search for to accelerate the universal operation of the Hyogo The establishment of IPHRC symbolizes the increasing prominence of human rights and institutional reforms within the OIC and its desire to increase its relevance and legitimacy among the peoples of member States and endorse its credibility at the international level. Moreover, IPHRC, as an initiative is symbolic of the growing influence of States like Turkey, Morocco, Indonesia and Malaysia whose approach to human rights may differ from that of traditional players in the OIC like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan. ( Asian Forum.2014: 31) And most importantly, the commission is the product of a serious political motivation on the part of all members to build a human rights mechanism. (Petersen. 2012 :3) IPHRC has the potential to be a significant agent of change in human rights practices of OIC countries domestically and internationally. With IPHRC, OIC countries have created a much needed mechanism for internal criticism and self-examination. Traditionally, OIC has tended to emphasis more on human rights violations in the exterior of the OIC, especially of Muslim minorities in the West and other non-Muslim countries.(Asian Forum.2014: 31) Another significant positive for IPHRC mandate is the requirement to promote and support Member State-accredited civil society organizations monitoring the human rights. Civil society participation in IPHRC meetings is subject, as stipulated in the Article 21 of IPHRC's founding statute, to the consent of host country and approval of Member. This highlights the need for willingness of member States to create an effective enabling environment for civil society associations, especially those handling the human rights, in their countries.
-OIC Plan of Action for Advancement of Women.
To accomplish the Ten-Year Program of Action, OIC has started the process of establishing a specific organization for women' s development in OIC members with the adoption of the Statue of OIC Women Development Organization in May 2009. The organization, which is to be based in Cairo, Egypt, is expected to work for the "development and promotion of the role of women in the OIC Member States, with capacity, talents and competence building, through various mechanisms, including training, education and rehabilitation, in line with Islamic principles and values."(Statute of the OIC WDO.2013) Moreover, Article 5(1) of the founding statute of the OIC Women Development Organization announces that it should "highlight the role of Islam in preserving the rights of the Muslim woman especially at the international level" Organizational objectives and mandate outlined in the Statute do not allow OIC Women Development Organization to engage directly in a women's rights discourse within the OIC member countries. Instead, its objective appears to be facilitating women's participation in development and countering the negative stereotypes of women in Muslim societies. Finally, safeguarding and endorsing the rights of Muslim minorities in non-OIC countries is one of the primary responsibilities and objectives of the OIC. OIC's engagement with situations involving Muslim minorities has been oriented towards mediation, conflict resolution and providing humanitarian support rather than direct intervention on issues related to human rights violations.( Asian Forum.2014)( OIC Charter (n 4), Article 1(16) ) In Asia, OIC's involvement had in the past been visible in their mediation efforts in the Philippines and Thailand, between the governments and Muslim separatists. More recently, OIC's direct involvement to resolve the communal conflict in Burma/Myanmar between Rohingya Muslims and majority Buddhists has been particularly important. However, questions remain whether OIC is open to hold itself to the same standards it demands from non-Member States when it comes to Muslim and non-Muslim minorities in OIC States, given increasing reports of abuse of the rights of such minorities in many OIC countries.
OIC's Reactions to Human Rights Violations, Occasional and Not Comprehensive
Like most intergovernmental organizations, OIC's membership is also not free from reports of human rights violations including some very serious allegations. OIC's role in promoting human rights in Member States however has largely been peripheral in the past. Its main attention still remains fixed on the human rights conditions in Occupied Palestinian Zones and the rights of Muslim minorities in non-OIC countries. OIC has predominantly been against country specific mandates at international human rights forums, arguing that such mandates are often politically motivated attempts by Western countries to intervene in domestic affairs of developing countries. They also discuss such country specific mandates are in contravention of the principles of the UN Human Rights Council. However, since the "Arab Spring" in early 2010, there appears to be an evolution in the approach of OIC States towards country specific resolutions at the UN. (Adam.2014) The OIC group at the UN Human Rights Council did not oppose to the first 'Arab Spring'-related country specific resolution on Libya.
At the 15th special meeting of the Council on 25 February 2011 focusing on the human rights situation in Libya, OIC condemned the excessive usage of force by the Libyan regime against civilians. (Akram.2011) .This resolution on the situation of human rights in Libya called for the establishment of an independent, international commission of inquiry to establish facts and circumstances of human rights violations (UN Human Rights Council Resolution.2011).
OIC's direct involvement in Libya during this time, however, was limited to providing humanitarian assistance to refugees fleeing the conflict. OIC's intervention which focused on supporting Security Council Resolution 1973 and protecting the integrity of Libyan territory placed the body in a unique position vis-a-vis both anti-government insurgents and the Libyan government (Shargieh.2012). OIC was the only international organization that had access to both parties after the Arab League and the UN Human Rights Council suspended Libya. Similarly, the OIC's reaction to the human rights situation in Syria saw a dramatic departure from OIC's usual practice. OIC's highest authority, the Islamic Summit, decided to suspend Syria from OIC in August 2012. (OIC Islamic Summit.2012) As Mayer argues: "The OIC has accumulated a record of self-contradictory statements on Islamic law and universal human rights law, sometimes treating Islamic law as overriding UN human rights principles and at other times claiming to support the UN system". (Mayer.2015 : 7-8 ) But OIC has not taken any negative position regarding the critical condition of human rights in the other member States like Bahrain, Yemen, Iraq, Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia etc.
Sovereignty Question and Voting Patterns at the UN Human Rights Council
OIC is the second biggest interstate organization, second only to the UN, and its member states often hold a considerable sway on global dynamics related to human rights at the UN General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Council -the world's apex human rights body. OIC's founding principles, which are based on the respect for sovereignty and non-interference in domestic matters, impact the decisions of the OIC group in UN human rights bodies. The OIC has consistently opposed country specific resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council arguing they are politically motivated attempts to interfere in the domestic affairs of targeted States without their consent, and a violation on national sovereignty. OIC argues that such resolutions go beyond the mandate of the Human Rights Council and consistently expresses its disagreement to country specific resolutions. ( Asian Forum.2014: 16) 
Critical Views, Ineffectiveness of OIC Instruments
The Cairo Declaration's content is typically complementary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It also recognizes and protects many rights prescribed in the international bill of rights. (Kayoglu.2013) But most of the disputes surrounding the Cairo Declaration stems from Articles 24 and 25. Article 24 states that "all the rights and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are subject to the Islamic Shari'a", and Article 25 establishes Islamic Shari'a as "the single basis of reference for the illumination or clarification of any of the articles of this Declaration". Other debatable exceptions are: restrictions on the rights to freedom of religion through prohibitions on conversion from Islam; and restrictions on freedom of expression which is confined within the limits prescribed in the Islamic Shari'a. The declaration also adds, in an effort to reconcile between Islam and international human rights, two specially Islamic rights: the right to remain Muslim (Article 10) and the prohibition of usury (riba) (Article 14).
It is essential to reminder that there are no complete independent analyses of the Ten-Year Program of Action or its implementation. All reports that profess OIC's accomplishments in carrying out the current Ten Year Program of Action are based on OIC' s own evaluations without much transparency in process and of determinants of success. (Adam. 2014) An another, and potentially more problematic, characteristic of the Commission's statutes is the restricted independence attributed to the Commission. As noted in Article 13 of the statutes, "The Commission shall support the OIC's position on human rights at the international level and consolidate cooperation among the Member States in the area of human rights" (OIC 2011c, emphasis added).
Likewise, it can merely present consultancy to "approving Member States" (OIC 2011c, Article 14, emphasis added). The Commission can offer recommendations to the Council of Ministers which can then make resolutions, but the Commission itself has no power to impose punishment on member states that do not respect their duties. Furthermore, the Commission does not have a clear instruction to scrutinize human rights violations in members, but is instead merely permitted to "carry out studies and research on priority human rights issues" (OIC 2011c, Article 16). And finally, the Commission's recommendations are not obligatory but must be ratified by the Council of Foreign Ministers. ( Petersen.2013 :34-5) None of the 18 representatives is a religious scholar, but most have solid ties to their states' bureaucracies, indicating OIC members' desire to retain influence within or over the Commission. ( Petersen.2013 :30) Establishment of the OIC IPHRC represents a significant landmark in the past of the OIC. The vision for its establishment was provided by the leadership of the OIC in the Ten-Year Program of Action (TYPOA). The commission can be a tool for evaluating the status quo of human rights in the member states and it can be also a vehicle for solider relations among the OIC and civil society."
According to the Statute of the IPHRC, its mandate is limited to carrying out consultative responsibilities for the Council of Foreign Ministers and submitting recommendations rather than investigating human rights violations in member countries or undertaking protective functions. The IPHRC has the potential to form part of an effective supra-national human rights regime, playing a role similar to that of the European Commission on Human Rights. The coming of the body signals a newfound commitment to human rights space within the OIC, and the consent of some originally reluctant conservative member states is a hopeful sign.
At the same time, member states have taken important measures to limit the power of the IPHRC, and the management of human rights issues rests essentially within the control of governments. Apropos membership, for example, there are no limitations on governments electing their own officials to the body. The IPHRC will not be handling cases of human rights violations as, for example, do the UN Human Rights Council and the regional human rights commissions, but rather is an advisory organ,. Its duties include gathering the backing of governmental and non-governmental human rights organizations. In addition, the Commission is expected to "conduct studies and research" on human rights (Articles 15-16) and provide "technical support for capacity building,". These tasks permit only a restricted, supportive role for the Commission; its activities are mostly dependent on the OIC or the demands of members.
The IPHRC Statute, instead of allowing the IPHRC to assume the function of promoting and protecting human rights in member states, asks it to support member states' efforts to protect human rights (Article 9) effectively reaffirming human rights protection as an exclusive prerogative of the state. This traditional interpretation of sovereignty that permeates new OIC human rights documents attempt to institutionalize the legitimacy of claims that human rights are domestic matters. Legally, IPHRC should be an independent body, but its expert members are introduced by the governments, therefore it cannot preserve its expected independency. The shadow of interests for members could put a heavy effect on the activities and decisions of the IPHRC.
It is obvious that for investigating the violations of human rights in the political systems of member states, OIC does not benefit from effective instrumentation or adequate facilities. It is an intergovernmental organization and the Member States have a control on its policies. In the revised 2008 charter, which was equally state-centric, the OIC committed itself "to uphold the objectives and principles of the present Charter, the Charter of the United Nations and international law as well as international humanitarian law while strictly adhering to the principle of non-interference in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.
In fact, the organization's highlighting on national sovereignty has prevented the transfer of authority to what could otherwise be effective supra-national human rights mechanisms.
But for Kayaoglu , There is some evidence to hope, however, that it could yet become an effective mechanism.( Kayaoglu. 2013 : 4) As the evolution of human rights commissions in other cases has revealed, these organizations, once created, are regularly able to gradually shape capital, assuage governments' fears, and secure greater independence and authority. The Commission currently has a degree of independence and has an interpretive authority over the OIC's human rights documents. It could also gain further leverage by assembling existing links between the OIC and other international organizations, particularly the UN.
The paper offers one important and final argument. The full enjoyment and the recognition of human rights in OIC Members could be considered as a challenging and difficult path but achievable.
